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ABSTRACT
Buying, selling, and transporting natural gas through underground pipelines has 
historically been regulated. However, in 1978 the Natural Gas Policy Act was passed, 
reducing the control that regulators had over the price of natural gas. In addition, the 
1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s Order #636 in 1992, continued deregulation of both natural gas prices and 
transportation from the point of sale to the customer’s burner tip.
Analysts have argued these regulatory changes have increased competition in the 
natural gas industry. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the Texas natural gas 
production industry in order to determine the impact of regulatory change on the structure 
of the industry. The empirical analysis confirms that deregulation has increased 
competition among Texas natural gas producers.
Ill
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CHAPTER I 
HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION
The U.S. natural gas industry has been evolving over the last fifty years. During 
this time, natural gas has gone from a fuel that producers have flared, to one which 
producers invest nearly $1,000,000 per well to drill for, extract, and purify the fuel for 
resale*. In addition, natural gas has grown from 11.9% of aggregate U.S. energy 
consumption in 1944 to 32.6% of aggregate U.S. energy consumption in 1994%. Natural 
gas production has also risen by 13.4% from 1983 to 1993, while natural gas consumption 
has risen by about 19% during the same time frame’. These changes have been the result 
of: 1) The environmental movement which encourages consumption of natural gas vis-à- 
vis other fuels. Natural gas emits fewer particulates, carbon oxides, nitrogen dioxides and 
sulfur dioxides in comparison to oil or coal; 2) Politicians have encouraged the use of 
domestic energy sources since the energy crisis of the 1970’s and the Persian Gulf war in 
the early 1990’s. Natural gas benefits from this political environment as most of the U.S. 
demand can be supplied by domestic and Canadian production'’; 3) Regulatory changes 
have affected the incentives firms have to enter or exit the market. Collectively, these
* Source: Oil and Gas Journal, “Natural Gas Statistics Sourcebook”, pg. 83.
2 Source: AGA, “1994 Gas Facts”, pg. 25 and AGA, “Historical Statistics of The Gas 
Industry”, 1956, pg. 32.
3 Source: AGA, “1994 Gas Facts”, pg. 25 and 126.
4 Source: AGA 1994 Gas Facts, pg. 34. The U.S. imports small amounts of natural gas 
from Mexico and minor amounts of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Algeria, otherwise 
all domestic U.S. demand is met through Canadian or domestic U.S. production.
1
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changes have increased the importance o f natural gas in meeting the needs of domestic 
aggregate energy demand.
As well as increasing in relative importance, natural gas markets have also 
experienced a regulatory transition. Regulation began in 1909 with state oversight of 
intrastate transportation and consumption of natural gas. This was followed by the 1938 
Natural Gas Act and the 1954 Supreme Court Phillips decision which established 
regulation for the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas. However, the 1978 
Natural Gas Policy Act, the 1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act, and Order #636 in 
1992 from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, have collectively deregulated the 
industry. The goal of deregulation has been to eliminate federal and state oversight which 
was an impediment, and no longer a surrogate, for competition in the transportation and 
sale of natural gas. Even though proponents of deregulation have touted its beneficial 
impact*, there has yet to be an empirical analysis which examines the effect of deregulation 
on the structure of the natural gas production industry. This paper is an empirical analysis 
of four firm concentration ratios in the Texas natural gas production industry. The paper 
determines how regulatory change has affected four-firm concentration in the production 
of Texas natural gas by including dummy variables for legislation implemented to 
deregulate the industry^. If the dummy variable coefficients have a statistically significant 
negative sign then deregulation has decreased Texas natural gas production concentration 
ratios and increased competition among Texas producers.
5 In an article entitled “Highlights: Natural Gas 1992: Issues and Trends” (1992) the 
Energy Information Administration suggests that “Open access increased competition at 
the wellhead, giving rise to an active spot market for the sale of natural gas, thus 
encouraging production.” However no empirical evidence o f increased competition is 
offered.
 ̂The four-firm concentration ratio is defined as the proportion of total natural gas 
industry sales made by the top four natural gas producers or marketers.
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The Texas natural gas production industry was studied for two reasons. First, 
national concentration data is not inexpensively available on a monthly basis. Second, 
Texas supplies the largest proportion of U.S. demand (over 33%) by producing over 6.9 
trillion cubic feet of gas aimually^. Texas production comes primarily from onshore wells 
in the west Texas area which have access to national gas markets. Texas also has the 
largest reserves, highest well count (over 46,000 wells), and the greatest value of 
marketed production at $10.8 billion of any state in the continental U.S.* Due to the 
significance of Texas markets, the impact of deregulation should be manifest in an 
analysis of Texas data.
The next Chapter is an introduction to natural gas markets and a more detailed 
discussion of the impact of deregulation on those markets. Chapter III is a literature 
review which summarizes scholarly work related to the topic and establishes a theoretical 
basis for the regression equation run in Chapter IV. Chapter IV presents the empirical 
model with five dummy variables, one for each piece of major legislation which 
deregulated the industry. Chapter V offers closing remarks.
Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Review 1994", page 193, Table 6.4.
* Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Review 1994", page 32, Table 6.
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CHAPTER n  
REGULATION AND NATURAL GAS MARKETS
Supplying natural gas demand involves two functions; 1) the production and sale 
of the gas commodity and; 2) the shipment of the commodity through underground pipes 
to consumers. Producers extract natural gas through wells from underground reservoirs, 
selling the gas by daily, monthly, or yearly negotiation of contracts at the point where the 
gas is removed from the ground, i.e. at the wellhead. Producers often aggregate 
production, selling it to a marketer who acts as the producers' agent to other customers. 
Wellhead contract negotiations between consumers and producers, or marketers, typically 
involve the quantity of gas to be sold, the price, delivery and receipt points for the gas, 
and the delivery date.
Once the gas is sold, it is shipped by investor or municipally owned utilities who 
invest in underground pipes which distribute gas to end users. This transportation 
function is segregated into two steps; I) shipping gas from the wellhead across state 
boundaries, called interstate transportation, accomplished by interstate pipelines and 2) 
transporting the gas within state boundaries to the end user, usually accomplished by 
Local Distribution Companies (LDCs)*. Historically, interstate pipelines gathered and 
purchased gas at the wellhead, transported it to LDCs, who repurchased it and transported 
it to the end-user. In most cases, interstate pipelines owned the gas from the wellhead to
* There are a number of jurisdictional and legal issues involved when determining what 
authority will regulate a pipeline. For a discussion of some of these issues see Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission Order issued February 15, 1994 in Docket No. CP93- 
258.
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the point of intersection with an LDC, who purchased it from the interstate pipeline and 
resold it to the customer. Customers of interstate pipelines, mostly LDCs, signed long 
term interstate transportation agreements for the right to transport and purchase gas from 
interstate pipelines. These rights provided LDCs the means to ship gas across state 
boundaries to their source of demand. The agreements for transportation rights usually 
specified the price of the capacity, the types of services provided, and the term. Most of 
the available interstate pipeline capacity rights have been owned by LDCs through 
interstate transportation agreements with terms of over twenty years.
Until the onset of deregulation, the price of wellhead supply and the cost, 
placement, and access to interstate pipelines was regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). The FERC, and its predecessor the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC), received statutory authority to regulate the interstate transportation of 
natural gas from the 1938 Natural Gas Act (NGA). The 1938 NGA was a reaction to the 
increasing amount of natural gas that was being used in interstate commerce which was 
exempt from state regulation according to a 1927 Supreme Court decision^. The NGA 
responded to the regulatory gap by providing the FPC with authority to determine “just 
and reasonable” interstate transportation rates, the responsibility to ascertain the “actual 
legitimate cost” of pipelines properties for the purpose of establishing rates, and the power 
to order an interstate pipeline company to extend or improve its transportation facilities*.
In a 1942 amendment, an interstate pipeline was required to obtain a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity from the commission before construction and extension of
* Gas Rate Fundamentals. American Gas Association, 1987. Pg. 76.
* The Regulation of Public Utilities. Charles F. Phillips, Jr. 2nd Edition, Copyright 1988. 
Page 634 - 636.
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service .̂ The Certificates authorized the pipeline to serve customers within a predefined 
territory within which the pipeline could continue to expand without obtaining further 
Certificates. This amendment granted interstate pipelines monopoly transportation rights 
within a predefined service area in exchange for regulation by federal authorities. The 
primary customers of interstate pipelines have been, and continue to be LDCs.
Although the 1938 NGA gave the FPC and the FERC the authority to regulate all 
aspects of the interstate transportation of natural gas, it was not until 1954 that the FERC 
was granted authority to regulate the purchase and sale of natural gas at the wellhead. In 
1954 the Supreme Court heard the case of Phillips Petroleum Company vs. the State of 
Wisconsin, the cities of Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Detroit, and the county of Wayne, 
Michigan. The plaintiffs argued that the rates of Phillips Petroleum should be regulated by 
the FPC under the statutory authority provided by the 1938 NGA. The Supreme Court 
ruled, “Protection of consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies 
was the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act” and that “... the legislative history indicates a 
congressional intent to give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of 
natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by pipeline company or not and whether 
occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company.”* This 
decision forced the FPC to regulate the price of gas at the wellhead which, coupled with 
the FPC’s authority to regulate the price of interstate transportation, gave the FPC 
ultimate authority to determine the final price of gas bundled with interstate transportation 
service.
^“Gas Rate Fundamentals”. American Gas Association. 1978, pg. 98. Certificates of 
Public Convenience and Necessity define where interstate service will be provided and at 
what cost.
* The Regulation of Public Utilities. Charles F. Phillips, Jr. 2nd Edition, Copyright 1988. 
Page 455 - 504.
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In tandem with the FPC’s regulatory responsibility, state Public Utility 
Commissions (PUC’s) regulate the intrastate transportation and sale of natural gas. 
Regulation of intrastate sales and transportation began in 1907 as privately-owned utilities 
expanded. Due to the high proportion of fixed assets invested in utility service, decreasing 
average costs were prevalent. These cost characteristcs led many to conclude that natural 
gas distribution closely resembled a natural monopoly^. As a result, state legislators in 
New York created the first regulatory commission to curb potential abuses of natural 
monopoly power. The new regulatory commission was supported by local utilities as they 
favored regulation vis-a-vis municipalization. New York’s regulation evolved into a state 
PUC with the authority to regulate all aspects of LDC’s distribution and sales of natural 
gas, including price, terms of service, placement of gas distribution facilities, and which 
customers would be served by the utility. These aspects of regulation ensure a monopoly 
market for local distribution of natural gas in exchange for regulation by state authorities. 
New York’s PUC became the model by which other PUCs were created. By 1930, every 
state except Delaware had a utility regulatory commission, with regulatory power similar 
to New York’s. *
According to this regulatory fi'amework®, a typical natural gas customer would 
purchase and transport gas through an LDC who purchased the gas from, and transported 
the gas through, an interstate pipeline. The interstate pipeline would have purchased its
® Gas Rate Fundamentals. American Gas Association, 1987. Pg. 73 - 77. A natural 
monopoly is defined as a firm which exhibits increasing returns to scale and decreasing 
average costs over a large range of output.
 ̂ See, AGA’s, “Gas Rate Fundamentals”, Pub. 1978, pg. 93. One of the important 
features of regulation which ensures a monopoly market is the ability of the PUC to 
scrutinize all utility investments in facilities to serve customers. By so doing, PUC’s can 
control which customers are served by which utilities and where.
* Gas Rate Fundamentals. American Gas Association, 1987. Pg. 75.
® See Appendix I, diagram entitled “Historical Structure of Natural Gas Industry”.
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gas commodity from a producer or marketer at the wellhead. Primarily LDCs distributed 
gas to end-users and purchased gas from interstate pipelines, and interstate pipelines 
principally purchased gas from marketers or producers and shipped gas to LDCs. The 
entire transaction, from the wellhead to the customer’s burner tip, was monitored and 
regulated by both the FERC and state regulatory commissions. LDCs were a monopoly 
transporter and seller of gas to their customers and were faced with monopsony by 
purchasing and transporting gas solely from interstate pipelines. This market structure 
suffered from several flaws. End consumers of the gas commodity could not negotiate the 
gas commodity price nor choose their transportation provider. The market price to 
customers did not send appropriate price signals as all costs incurred by the LDC, 
including gas commodity and all transportation costs, were bundled into one rate which 
was litigated before either the FERC or a state regulatory commission. Customers could 
not choose which services, gas procurement or transportation service, they would like at 
separate rates. In addition, customers could not obtain transportation service directly 
from an interstate pipeline, bypassing the LDCs transportation and procurement services, 
because virtually all interstate transportation capacity was under contract to LDCs.
Over the last 20 years regulatory reform has been aimed at correcting these market 
imperfections. As a result of deregulation, most LDC customers can gain access to 
wellheads outside their home state by subleasing contractual interstate transportation 
capacity on interstate pipelines. Once access to the wellhead is obtained, customers can 
negotiate their own gas commodity contracts with wholesale suppliers and producers 
bypassing the LDCs and interstate pipeline’s procurement services. In addition, large 
customers*® can now build their own distribution facilities and connect directly to an 
interstate pipeline, bypassing the LDCs transportation services. Large customers may also
*° Only large commercial and industrial customers have sufficient load to make purchasing 
their own gas supply worth the cost of monitoring and negotiating for their own gas 
supply.
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connect directly to a group of producing gas wells and bypass all services provided by 
both LDCs and interstate pipelines.** Regulatory change has thus reduced both the 
interstate pipelines monopsony and LDCs distribution monopoly. Customers can now 
choose which services they would like from competing suppliers. Three regulations 
passed to achieve these goals were the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), the 
Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 (NGWDA), and FERC Order #636 in 
1992*2.
The Natural Gas Policy Act** (NGPA) of 1978 reduced the FERC’s control over 
the wellhead price of gas granted by the 1954 Supreme Court Phillips decision. The 
NGPA phased-in price deregulation for different categories*'* of gas supply over a period 
of nine years. The phased-in approach, along with continuing price controls on certain 
categories of gas, was intended to prevent a price spike after deregulation. The NGPA 
deregulated wholesale prices by January 1, 1985 for new onshore gas well gas** produced
** The major gas producing basins in the United States are located throughout Texas, New 
Mexico, Colorado, Oklahoma, California, and Kansas. Therefore this type of bypass 
threat is unique to these areas.
*2 See Appendix H, diagram entitled “Timeline for Natural Gas Industry Deregulation”.
** Phillips, Charles F. Jr. “The Regulation of Public Utilities”. 2nd Edition, 1988.
*'* For a description of the categories, deregulation dates, and ceiling prices see; Institute 
of Gas Technology, “Energy Statistics”, Chicago, IL. First Quarter 1987, pgs. 70-75.
** Phillips, Charles F. Jr. “The Regulation of Public Utilities”. 2nd Edition, 1988. Pages 
638-639. A new onshore well was defined as; 1) a new well at least 2.5 miles from the 
nearest marker well; or 2) a new well 1,000 feet deeper than the nearest deepest marker 
well within a 2.5 mile radius. A new well was defined as; 1) a well where the surface 
drilling began on or after February 19, 1977; or 2) a well whose depth increased by means 
of drilling on or after February 19, 1977 to a completion location which is located at least 
1,000 feet below the depth of the deepest completion location of such well attained before 
February 19, 1977.
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at more than 5000 feet and July 1, 1987 for new onshore gas well gas produced at less 
than 5000 feet. All gas categorized as “old gas” well gas remained under price control.
The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act*2 (NGWDA) of 1989 eliminated all price 
controls remaining after the NGPA. The act called for deregulation of wholesale natural 
gas prices by May 15, 1991 for “newly spudded”** well gas and January 1, 1993 for “old 
gas”. Old gas represented the largest quantity of gas still under price control. Together 
the NGPA and the NGWDA eliminated the FERC’s role of setting natural gas commodity 
prices at the wellhead and allowed the interaction of natural gas buyers with producers and 
marketers to determine wellhead prices.
The NGPA and the NGWDA attempted to increase competition by allowing 
wholesale gas prices to fluctuate according to supply and demand conditions at the 
wellhead. FERC Order #636*^ attempted to increase competition by providing more 
direct access to wellhead supply. This goal was accomplished in primarily two ways: 1) 
Interstate pipelines were required to seperate their procurement and transportation 
services and allow customers a choice of which services they wanted at separate rates; 2) 
Order #636 created a market for unutilized interstate capacity rights. Unutilized capacity 
rights can be subleased by customers desiring access to wellhead supply outside their own 
state from other interstate pipeline capacity holders. Allowing customers to purchase 
unused capacity rights gives cusotmers access to wellheads beyond their own state 
boundaries. Customers purchasing unused capacity rights can complete their transaction 
through Electronic Bulletin Boards (EBBs). The FERC required interstate pipelines to
*̂  Gas that was first produced from a well before February 19, 1977.
*2 “Natural Gas Decontrol Act of 1989”. American Gas Association. 1989.
** Gas that was under an existing contract where surface drilling did not start until after 
July 27, 1989.
19 “Order No. 636 - Final Rule”. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 1992.
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create EBBs so customers could complete capacity trades and post completed capacity 
release deals electronically. EBBs have developed into an efficient method for customers 
to obtain access to wellheads outside their own state boundaries.
Together regulatory reforms have allowed LDC customers to negotiate gas supply 
arrangements at the wellhead and transport gas on subleased interstate pipeline capacity. 
Customers can now ship gas through either the LDC’s distribution system or a pipeline 
owned by the customer and directly connected to an interstate pipeline. This process 
replaced interstate pipelines buying the gas commodity and transporting it to LDC’s who 
re-purchased it and transported it to the end-user. These changes in the marketplace have 
alleviated the need for continuing regulatory oversight by the FERC and state 
commissions. The FERC has issued policy statements supporting the establishment of 
market based rates and alternatives to traditional regulatory oversight. In addition, state 
commissions have encouraged LDCs to provide new service choices while ensuring 
captive customers are not exploited.
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CHAPTER m  
REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH
This study employs an empirical model* to determine the effect of natural gas 
industry deregulation on four firm concentration ratios in the Texas natural gas production 
industry. The four firm concentration ratio is intended to measure the intensity of 
competition faced in the natural gas market. The higher the four firm concentration ratio 
the less intense competition faced by industry participants. The study shows that a 
statistically significant decrease in the four firm concentration ratio occured at the onset of 
government deregulation, increasing competition among Texas natural gas producers.
The theoretical link between concentration ratios and industrial competition is 
attributed to Joe S. Bain. Bain (1951) showed that industries where the largest eight firms 
held a market share in excess of 70% had significantly higher returns*. The article created 
a theoretical link between market structure, the conduct of market participants, and 
overall industrial performance as measured by price-cost margins*. This structure, 
conduct, performance (S-C-P) paradigm implies that firms in a highly concentrated 
industry (high four firm concentration ratio) are more likely to participate in collusive
* The empirical model is presented in Chapter IV.
2 Bain, Joe S. “Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration, American 
Manufacturing, 1936-1940”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1951. Pgs. 293- 
294.
* Price-cost margins are often calculated by taking the total value of shipments less payroll 
and materials costs divided by the total value of shipments. The higher this proportion the 
greater prices, and likely firm conduct in the marketplace, deviates from the perfectly 
competitive outcome.
12
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behavior, restrain output, and raise prices toward a monopoly level'*. Therefore, as 
concentration ratios decrease, collusive behavior becomes more difficult, competitive 
pressures mount, and price cost margins shrink. This S-C-P paradigm has been tested by 
numerous authors since Bain’s study in 1951. Bain (1956)*, W.G. Shepherd (1972)^, and 
Almarin Phillips (1972)* have all found positive relationships between concentration and 
price-cost margins. More recently, Robert W. Kilpatrick (1976)* and John E. Kwoka, Jr. 
(1981)9 have both tested the S-C-P theory and found that concentration ratios are 
positively related to price-cost margins. Kilpatrick studied the correlation coefficients*® 
between average concentration ratios and rates of return for all four and five digit SIC**
'* For a more detailed discussion of the Structure, Conduct, Performance paradigm see 
Carlton, Dennis and Perloff, Jeffiey, “Modem Industrial Organization”, Second Edition, 
Harper Collins, 1994. Chapter 1.
* Bain, Joe S. “Barriers to New Competition”, Harvard University Press, 1956.
 ̂Shepherd, W.G. “The Elements of Market Structure”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, February 1972. Pgs. 25-38.
2 Phillips, Almarin. “An Economic Study of Price Fixing, market Structure, and 
Performance in British Industry in the Early 1950’s”, in K. Cowling, Market Structure and 
Corporate Behavior, 1972.
* kilpatrick, Robert W. “The Validity of The Average Concentration Ratio as a Measure of 
Industry Structure”, Southern Economic Journal, April 1976. Pgs. 711-715.
9 Kwoka, J.E. “Does the Choice of Concentration Measure Really Matter?”, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, June 1981. Pgs. 445-453.
*® The Correlation Coefficient is a measure of the degree of association between two 
variables. It ranges fi'om a -1 to a +1. A positive number indicates variables which 
increase and decrease in unison, while a negative number indicates variables which move 
in opposite directions. For the formula to calculate the correlation coefficient see 
Gujarati, Damodar N. “Basic Econometrics”, 2nd Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1988. Pgs. 67- 
68.
** SIC is the Standard Industrial Classification system used by the United States for 
classifying firms for the purpose of studying their industry. The more digits included in 
the code the more detailed the description of the industry.
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code industries listed by the Census Bureau in 1963. The correlation coefficients ranged 
from .25 to .5, all showing a positive relationship between concentration ratios and rate of 
return. Kwoka used the 1972 Census of Manufactures to develop a multivariate 
regression with price-cost margin, defined as industry value-added minus payroll and 
divided by value o f shipments, for the dependent variable. Various N-firm concentration 
ratios were included as independent variables**. Kwoka found that two and three firm 
concentration ratios were statistically significant indicators of industry price-cost margins 
and the degree that firms exercised market power. In addition to these studies, the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have issued joint Antitrust 
Guidelines for horizontal mergers which support the S-C-P paradigm**. The Guidelines 
state, “A merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise 
unless it significantly increases concentration and results in a concentrated market, 
properly defined and measured. Mergers that either do not significantly increase 
concentration or do not result in a concentrated market ordinarily require no further 
analysis.”*'* Based upon the linkage between concentration and competitive behavior 
supported by these studies, four firm concentration ratios were used in this paper to 
determine the effect deregulation has had on the competitiveness of the natural gas 
production market.
Although the literature generally supports the S-C-P paradigm, numerous articles 
have begun to question whether or not an N-firm concentration ratio is the appropriate
** An N-firm concentration ratio signifies any number of firms market shares comprising 
the concentration ratio. Kwoka studied 10 separate concentration ratios ranging from 1 
firm to 10 firms.
** Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. “1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines”, April 2, 1992.
*'* Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. “1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines”, April 2, 1992. Pg. 6.
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measure for market structure and competitiveness**. There are three commonly used 
measures of market structure, 1) N-firm concentration ratios, 2) the leading firm’s market 
share, and 3) the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). N-firm concentration ratios have 
already been discussed and the leading firm’s market share is a ratio of the top firms 




Where: (MSi) represents the market share of firm i and there are n firms 
in the market
The HHI gives heavier weight to firms with large market shares than to firms with small 
shares as a result of squaring the market shares. This feature o f the HHI corresponds to 
the S-C-P theory that the greater the concentration of output in a small number of firms (a 
high HHI) the greater the likelihood that, other things equal, competition in a market will 
be negligible. In addition, the HHI measures the impact of all firms on the structure of the 
industry vis-a-vis measuring only the top one, four, or eight firms as with concentration 
ratios.
** See Gale, Bradley T and Branch, Ben S. “Concentration versus Market Share: Which 
Determines Performance and Why Does It Matter?”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 1982. 
Pgs. 83-105 for an alternative to the S-C-P paradigm. This article shows that ROI 
(before-tax profits, divided by invested capital) is dependent upon leading firm market 
share but not on the four firm concentration ratio. The authors conclude that “Market 
share increases profits through the benefits of scale economies.” In other words, these 
authors believe that efficient firms outcompete other less efficient firms, gaining market 
share and becoming more profitable.
*® Total production is the example used here, however a single market share can be 
calculated using income, sales, or other relevant data.
*2 Rhoades, Stephen A. “The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index”, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
March 1993. Pgs. 188-189.
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Recent literature has begun to support the HHI as the best overall indicator of 
market structure and competition. Amato (1995) used 1982 Census of Manufactures data 
to run J-tests on a linear regression using price-cost margins as the dependent variable and 
the HHI, four firm concentration ratio, and the leading firm’s market share as independent 
variables**. The J-test identifies the relevant variables in a regression by mathematically 
comparing the results of one regression equation against the results of a similar, but 
restricted, equation. According to Amato results, models with the HHI and the leading 
firm’s market share consistently passed the J-test, while models with the four firm 
concentration ratio did not. Amato concludes, “First, there is evidence to support the 
claim that the Hirschman-Herfindahl index provides a superior proxy to the four firm 
concentration ratio as a measure of market structure. Support for this finding lies in the 
results of J-tests that treat the choice between the Hirschman-Herfindahl and CR4*9 as a 
test of nonnested hypothesis. The J-tests conclude that the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
should be included in the model, while CR4 can be deleted.”*®
In addition to Amato’s work, Hannah and Key (1977) developed a list of desirable 
characteristics for a measure of market structure**. They suggest that the measure:
1) Increase when sales are transferred from a smaller firm to a larger firm.
2) Increase when a merger occurs.
3) Increase when customers have a bias toward larger firms.
** Amato, Louis. “The Choice of Structure Measure in Industrial Economics”, Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, Spring 1995.
*9 Amato uses this notation for the four firm concentration ratio.
*® Amato, Louis. “The Choice of Structure Measure in Industrial Economics”, Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, Spring 1995. Pg. 50.
** Hannah, Leslie and Key, John. “Concentration in Modem Industry”, The MacMillan 
Press LTD., 1977.
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4) Decrease when customers are equally likely to conduct business with a larger 
firm as with a smaller firm.
5) Remain unaffected by the entry or exit of insignificant firms.
Hannah and Key observe “How does the concentration ratio, the commonest of all 
[measures of market structure], stand up? Reasonably well, since although it does not 
necessarily react positively to a merger or sales transfer it will never be perverse in the 
direction of change.”** However, in conjunction with this praise, Hannah and Key assert 
some of the major deficiencies. “The deficiencies of this measure are obvious, and widely 
recognized. The choice of N is arbitrary, much information is wasted and dramatic shifts 
in industrial structure can occur to which the index will be wholly impervious. So long as 
they affect only members of the top N, or the rest of the industry, the CRN** is unaffected 
by them.”***
Scherer (1980) adds to Hannah and Key’s evaluation of the concentration ratio by 
proposing the following six specific deficiencies in the measure**;
1) Concentration ratios often rely on U.S. Census of Manufactures data. This data 
has difficulty disaggregating sales by a single firm into separate product lines, 
which can bias concentration ratios.
** Hannah, Leslie and key, John. “Concentration in Modem Industry”, The MacMillan 
Press LTD., 1977. Pg. 50.
** Hannah and Key use this notation to denote any number of different concentration 
ratios, i.e. two firm, four firm, eight firm, etc.
*'* Hannah, Leslie and key, John. “Concentration in Modem Industry”, The MacMillan 
Press LTD., 1977. Pg. 48.
** Scherer, P.M. “Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance”, 2nd Edition,
Rand McNally, 1980.
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2) The Census of Manufactures often does not include relevant substitutes in the 
definition of the market. Ignoring substitutes overestimates monopoly power held 
by firms in an industry.
3) Census of Manufacture data is often too broadly or too narrowly defined.
4) Import competition is ignored by Census of Manufacture data.
5) Structural characteristics of the market must be considered. For example, a 
large number of equal size firms selling the same cola may seem competitive until 
it is discovered they all have fi'anchise agreements with Pepsi.
6) When strong product differentiation exists, the four firm concentration ratio 
may understate the true exercise of monopoly power.
Nonetheless, Scherer recognizes that “Given these deficiencies what practical steps may be 
taken to avoid mistakes in the use and interpretation of concentration ratios? The most 
important is to recognize that pitfalls exist: concentration indices are at best a one 
dimensional indicator of monopoly power, and their use must be governed by common 
sense.”*̂
Nonetheless, the four firm concentration ratio is recognized as a reasonable proxy 
for the HHI index, as well as a statistically significant indicator of price-cost margins and 
competitiveness. Scherer (1980) shows the HHI and the four firm concentration ratio are 
highly correlated, providing similar results when used in regression analysis. However, 
Kwoka (1981) criticizes the idea that concentration ratios are viable measures of market 
structure solely because they are highly correlated with the HHI. Kwoka determines that 
concentration ratios are indicators of price-cost margins irrespective of the high 
correlation between the HHI and the four firm concentration ratio. In addition, Waterson 
and Cowling (1976) studied the change in price-cost margins and the change in four firm
2̂  Scherer, P.M. “Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance”, 2nd Edition, 
Rand McNally, 1980. Pg. 64.
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concentration ratios from 1958 to 1962 in Census of Production data^ .̂ They used 
changes in the variables over time versus utilizing cross-sectional data, as previous studies 
have done, in order to prevent model misspecifrcation. They suggest cross-sectional 
studies, which look at concentration across a number of industries at one time, are 
misspecifred because they omit the elasticity of demand as a relevant variable in 
determining profits. The elasticity of demand can be omitted if the assumption of constant 
elasticity o f demand across a number of industries holds. Waterson and Cowling propose 
that holding the elasticity of demand constant for one industry over time is better then an 
assumption of constant demand elasticities across industries. Their study shows that 
changes in the four firm concentration ratio over time are positively related to changes in 
the price-cost margin over time.
Along with this evidence of the validity of concentration ratios as a measure of 
market structure and competitiveness, Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986) show that 
the HHI is related to the four firm concentration ratio in a horn-shaped fashion^*. In other 
words, at low values of the four firm concentration ratio it tends to follow the HHI 
closely, while at higher levels there is greater divergence of the two measures. They state, 
“Given the horn-shaped relationship, it follows that the choice between and Ck in 
profit regressions should not matter too much for low concentration industries (C4 < .50)
2'̂  Cowling, Keith and Waterson, Michael. “Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure”, 
Economica, August 1976, Pgs. 267-274.
28 Sleuwaegen, Leo and Dehandschutter, Wim. “The Critical Choice Between The 
Concentration Ratio and The H-Index in Assessing Industry Performance”, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, December 1986.
25 H is used by Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter to signify the HHI. Also the notation Ck 
is used by the authors to denote any level of concentration ratio, i.e. two, three, four firm, 
etc. The authors also use the notation C4 to denote the four firm concentration ratio.
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but may become very important for high concentration industries (C4^.50).”2o They 
conclude by showing that the explanatory power (measured by the R-squared^*) of a 
regression of low concentration industry (C4 < .50) profitability on the HHI is virtually 
unaffected when concentration ratios are substituted for the HHI. They also show that the 
explanatory power of a regression of high concentration industry (C4^.50) profitability 
on the HHI is significantly affected when concentration ratios are substituted for the HHI. 
Additionally, Sleuwaegen, De Bondt, and Dehandschutter (1989) based upon their 
previous study in 1986, discuss the benefits of using both four firm concentration ratios 
and HHI in analyzing market structure and competition^^. They conclude that analyzing 
an N-Firm concentration ratio in conjunction with the HHI provides a better 
understanding of the degree o f monopoly power held by firms in an industry.
Although there is debate about the appropriate measure for market structure, 
concentration ratios have not been rejected as a reasonable index. Eventhough it is widely 
recognized that the HHI is a superior measure to the N firm concentration ratio, 
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986) show that the two measures are nearly identical if 
utilized in an industry with C4 < .50. The Texas natural gas production industry C4 is a 
maximum of .33 during the study period. Therefore according to Sleuwaegen and 
Dehandschutter four firm concentration ratios, in the case of Texas natural gas
Sleuwaegen, Leo and Dehandschutter, Wim. “The Critical Choice Between The 
Concentration Ratio and The H-Index in Assessing Industry Performance”, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, December 1986. Pg. 199.
The R-squared shows the amount of the variation of Y values from their mean that is 
explained by the regression equation. It has a maximum value of 100% which would 
result when all data points lie exactly on the regression line. For the formula to calculate 
the R-squared see Gujarati, Damodar N. “Basic Econometrics”, 2nd Edition, McGraw- 
Hill, 1988. Pgs. 66-68.
22 Sleuwaegen, Leo E., De Bondt, Raymond R., and Dehandschutter, Wim V. “The 
Herfindahl Index and Concentration Ratios Revisited”, Antitrust Bulletin. 1989. Pages 625 
-640.
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production, carry virtually the same information as the HHI would provide. In addition, 
information is not readily available to the general public in order to calculate the HHI. 
Additionally, this study did not use Census data so many of the pitfalls that Scherer (1980) 
details are not applicable. For these reasons, this research uses the four firm concentration 
ratio to model the competitiveness of the Texas natural gas production industry.
Beyond the measure chosen in this study to gauge market structure and 
competition, various authors have studied other variables which determine market 
structure and competition. Rosenbaum and Reading (1991) studied the relationship 
between the Herfindahl index and import shares in regional portland cement m a r k e t s ^ ^  
They found that as the Herfindahl index increases, import shares begin to rise. In addition, 
Carlton and Perloff (1994) suggest barriers to entry and exit, product differentiation, and 
government regulation can have a significant impact on market structure, as measured by 
either concentration ratios or the Herfindahl index̂ '*.
After consideration of these studies, import shares (Rosenbaum and Reading), 
barriers to exit and product differentiation (Carlton and Perloff) were not modeled as 
variables in this study. This is due to the nature of natural gas markets during the study 
period. Natural gas is a very homogeneous product^^, with little history of product 
innovation. Considering producers can stop production with a turn of a valve at the 
wellsite, barriers to exit are virtually non-existent. In addition, import shares were a 
relatively small proportion of total marketed production during the study period and were
Rosenbaum, David I. and Reading, Steven L. “Market Structure and Import Share: A 
Regional Market Analysis.”, Southern Economic Journal, 1988.
Carlton, Dennis W. and Perloff, Jeffrey M. “Modem Industrial Organization”. Second 
Edition, 1994. Chapters 1 and 9.
35 Natural gas can be distinguished by its Btu and water or hydrocarbon content. Gas is 
dehydrated at the wellsite removing the water and hydrocarbons. Gas is then mixed, 
leveling the Btu content, as it travels by pipeline. Therefore, gas becomes a very 
homogeneous product after basic processing and transportation.
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therefore not included as a variable’s. However, barriers to entry and government 
regulation (Carlton and Perloff) variables were included for the study. Previous 
discussion of related research supports a model with the four firm concentration ratio as 
the dependent variable and proxies for government regulation and barriers to entry as 
independent variables.
3s Although imports shares have been rising they averaged less than 5% of total marketed 
production during the study period.
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Industry analysts have arbitrarily concluded that deregulation has created a more 
competitive natural gas wellhead market\ However, there has yet to be an empirical 
study^ of the impacts that deregulation has had upon the structure of the Texas natural gas 
wellhead industry, as measured by the four firm concentration ratio. The following 
empirical model was created, based upon the discussion in Chapter 3, to analyze the 
effects of deregulation on the market structure and competitiveness of Texas natural gas 
production:
4 firm concentration ratio = Pi + P2 (Ave. Footage Drilled for New Wells) + Ps (National 
Index of Industrial Production) - P< (Lagged Natural Gas Prices) - Ps (NGPA Jan. 1985)
' An article in Consumers’ Research Magazine entitled “Why You Pay Too Much For 
Natural Gas”, May 1989 states “During the past several years, dramatic breakthroughs 
have been achieved in bringing greater competition in the natural gas industry, thereby 
reducing gas prices for consumers, removing restraints on the use of gas, and restoring 
consumer confidence in the adequacy of the natural gas resource base. While the industry 
operates in a much healthier environment then it did a few years ago, much remains to be 
done.” However, no empirical evidence o f ‘greater competition’ is offered.
 ̂ De Vany and Walls have studied changes in prices caused by deregulation of the natural 
gas industry. They conclude that natural gas commodity prices behave as if competition is 
intensifying. An excerpt of their complete study is given in Public Utilities Fortnightly, 
“The Triumph of Markets in Natural Gas”, April 15, 1995, pg. 21.
23
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- p6 (NGPA July 1987) - p? (NGWDA May 1991) - pg (NGWDA Jan. 1993) - pg (Order 
#636) + 8i
Monthly data was collected for January 1977 through December 1994. Data for 
average total footage drilled and natural gas prices was extracted from the Monthly 
Energy Review (MER) published by the Energy Information Administration of the 
Department of Energy. The index of national industrial production was obtained from 
FAME ECONOMICS, a Macroeconomic database. Data on monthly production used in 
calculating the four firm concentration ratio, were provided by GASEARCH a Texas 
based data acquisition service^. Each of the independent variables are described in more 
detail below.
Footage Drilled - The variable was included to measure entry barriers'* and was the 
average depth, in feet, of new gas wells. Deeper drilling means higher costs of entry for 
new firms, and less firms able to enter, leading to higher four firm concentration.
Industrial Production - An index of total U.S. industrial production was used to 
model this variable. As the economy slows, as evidenced by lower industrial production, 
demand for gas should fall, decreasing prices and causing higher cost firms to exit or shut 
in their production. This process should lead to higher four firm concentration ratios.
’ The data obtained from GASEARCH had a small number of anomalies, i.e. production 
and revenue amounts for a certain producer during one month that were unreasonably 
large. These data anomalies were removed before calculation of the four firm 
concentration ratio and the development of the final empirical model.
" Entry barriers are an indicator of market structure. See; Carlton and Perloff, “Modem 
Industrial Organization”, Second Edition. 1994. Chapters 1 and 9.
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Lagged Natural Gas Prices - This variable is the average monthly natural gas price 
for all natural gas produced in the U.S., lagged 12 months. The variable was lagged in 
order to prevent a simultaneity problem between current natural gas prices and current 
four firm concentration. Higher lagged natural gas prices should stimulate additional entry 
by new firms and decrease concentration.
Dummv Variables for Government Regulation - Intercept dummy variables were 
included to measure the impact of deregulation. The dummies were given a value of 0 
before the effective date of the new regulation and 1 after the effective date. Dummy 
variables were included for the NGPA’s January 1985 and July 1987 deregulation dates, 
the NGWDA’s May 1991 and January 1993 deregulation dates, and for Order #636. If 
policy makers accomplished their goals of increasing competition through these 
regulations then at least some of the coefficients should be negative and significant.
The initial regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) exhibited 
autocorrelation, or a strong association between error terms of the regression^. 
Autocorrelation violates one of the assumptions of OLS theory, causing OLS estimators 
to be inefficient. To correct for autocorrelation the data were adjusted using an estimate 
of the relationship between the actual error terms®. After adjustment the following results 
were obtained:
® Please see Appendix m , a graph of the error terms of the initial regression as well as the 
results of a regression of the error terms as a function of the error terms lagged one 
period. An alternative model using a time trend variable was also run with the results 
contained in Appendix EH. The time trend variable model also exhibited autocorrelation.
® See Gujarati, “Basic Econometrics”. Second Edition, 1988. Pages 383 - 384. This 
section describes the corrections for autocorrelation in time series data.
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error T - Statistic
Constant .068799 .007825 8.7925




Lagged Prices -.0099 .005093 -1.94
NGPA Jan. 1985 -.00581 .008512 -.683
NGPA July 1987 -.01802 .00869 -2.073
NGWDA May 1991 -.00545 .0085 -.639
NGWDA Jan. 1993 .0178 .0088 2.01
Order #636 .00485 .0088 .549
Where: NGWDA = Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act 
NGPA = Natural Gas Policy Act
N = 215 F-Stat= 11.687 Adjusted R^2 = .2855 D-W Stat=1.9I 
After adjustment for autocorrelation, the adjusted equations error terms were 
saved. These error terms were regressed against themselves lagged one period. This 
regression showed no relationship between the error terms and the error terms lagged one 
period suggesting the autocorrelation problem was corrected. According to the results in 
the matrix, the following conclusions can be drawn for each variable:
Footage Drilled - Based on the statistically insignificant but positive coefficient for 
this variable, the further firms must drill to extract new gas, the less firms that enter the 
industry, and the higher four firm concentration will be. However, according to the results 
entry barriers were not a significant indicator of market structure in the production of 
natural gas during the study period.
National Industrial Production Index - The statistical significance of this variable 
suggests that market concentration is impacted by the business cycle. The negative 
coefficient means that as the overall economy improves, more Texas firms enter the
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natural gas production industry, decreasing four firm concentration. In other words, 
increases in industrial production stimulates natural gas demand which encourages entry 
by new firms and lowers concentration.
Lagged Natural Gas Prices - The coefficient was negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting current concentration falls when lagged natural gas prices increase. 
This result supports the results fi-om the national industrial production index variable. As 
natural gas prices increase, through changing supply and demand conditions, new firms 
find it profitable to enter and concentration falls.
NGPA January 1985 - The insignificance of this variable can be explained by two 
factors: 1) According to the NGPA’s price deregulation by category of gas, little gas was 
actually deregulated on January 1, 1985. 2) Wholesale price regulation, beginning with 
the 1954 Supreme Court decision, had existed for over three decades and gas under 
existing contracts would not be available immediately for resale at market prices. Thus, 
because of the relatively large amount of gas still under price regulation, commodity prices 
were left relatively unaffected and firms did not have an immediate incentive to enter or 
exit the industry.
NGPA Julv 1987 - The coefficient on this variable was significant and negative, 
suggesting that concentration fell after July 1, 1987. There are two possible reasons for 
this result: 1) The July 1987 date deregulated virtually all new gas’. Therefore firms with 
new wells or new production could benefit from selling their gas free of federal control. 
This stimulated new gas to be produced by new natural gas firms causing concentration to
’ New gas was defined by the NGPA as gas first produced after 1977.
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fall. 2) Market participants had gained experience with deregulated gas during the 
previous two years so consumers and firms were comfortable taking advantage of the new 
deregulated environment.
NGWDA Mav 1991 - This variable was statistically insignificant. This may be the 
result of what type o f gas was deregulated at his time. In May 1991 gas under an existing 
contract where surface drilling did not occur until mid-1989 was released from price 
control. This gas was relatively insignificant compared to all other “old gas”*. The release 
of a relatively small amount of gas from price control suggests both market prices and the 
quantity of gas still under price regulation were relatively unaffected by this deregulation 
date. Thus, firm’s incentives to enter or exit the industry did not change as a result of this 
legislation.
NGWDA January 1993 - The coefficient on this variable was statistically 
significant at the 95% level and positive. There have been two trends taking place in the 
industry over the study period. First, concentration consistently fell until about 1993 and 
then slightly increased over the next couple of years®. Second, the number of total firms 
has fallen likely due to an increase in merger activity. Most of the merger activity has 
taken place during the last decade of the study period as firms reacted to the changing 
competitive environment initiated by the NGPA. As a result of the continuously favorable
* Old gas is defined by the NGPA as gas first produced before 1977 and under the 
NGWDA was not to be deregulated until January 1993.
’ See Appendix IV which is a graph of the four firm concentration ratio and the total 
number of firms in the Texas natural gas production industry over time.
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merger environment, a reconcentration of the Texas natural gas production industry has 
occurred since 1993 resulting in a positive coefficient on this variable*®.
FERC Order #636 - According to regression results, FERC Order #636 did not 
have a significant impact upon producer concentration. Order #636 deregulated interstate 
transportation service encouraging more buyers to gain direct access to wellhead markets. 
However, even though more buyers were able to access wellhead supply, Order #636 did 
not directly deregulate wholesale prices and therefore did not have a direct impact on the 
incentives for firms to enter or exit the industry. In addition, previous FERC orders, 
including Order #436 and Order #500, had provided temporary means for natural gas 
users to gain direct access to wellhead supply. Therefore, by the time FERC Order #636 
finalized rules allowing interstate pipeline capacity release and service unbundling, many 
customers were already wellhead market participants.
See Appendix V which is a matrix showing the annual average number of total wells in 
the industry, the annual average of total wells controlled by the top four producers, and 
the annual average total U.S. natural gas price at the wellhead. From about 1990 until 
1994 the top four producer’s share of total industry wells has risen causing an increase in 
the four firm concentration ratio coinciding with the implementation of the NGWDA.
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION
The natural gas production industry has experienced a regulatory transition which 
has eliminated price controls, increased the interaction between buyers and sellers of the 
gas commodity, and provided direct access to wellhead markets. The Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1978 (NGPA), the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 (NGWDA), and 
FERC Order #636 in 1992 were regulatory milestones in advancing these goals. This 
legislation was passed to minimize or eliminate market imperfections, i.e. monopoly in 
distribution and sales of natural gas, that have been present for almost 90 years. 
Proponents of deregulation have argued that competition has intensified in the natural gas 
industry, benefiting consumers, shippers, and producers of natural gas. However, little 
empirical work has been completed which determines the impact of deregulation on 
industry competition. The goal of this paper was to empirically determine the impact 
deregulation has had on Texas natural gas producers. Texas is the U.S. leader in the 
natural gas production industry, therefore the effect of deregulation should be manifest in 
an analysis of Texas data. The paper discussed the regulatory changes that have taken 
place in the U.S. and their impact on the Texas natural gas production industry four firm 
concentration ratio. Of the five dummy variables included to measure the impact 
deregulation has had on the four firm concentration ratio, 2 were statistically significant.
30
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The first was the dummy for the NGPA in July, 1987 and the second was the dummy for 
the NGWDA in January, 1993.
According to empirical results, four firm concentration ratios declined after the 
NGPA in 1987 but increased after the NGWDA in 1993. This is evidenced by the 
statistically significant negative coefficient on the dummy variable for the NGPA and the 
statistically significant positive coefficient on the dummy variable for the NGWDA. 
Although the positive coefficient on the dummy for the NGWDA suggests competitive 
pressures decreased as a result of this legislation, the sign of the coefficient can be 
explained by the increase in the top four producer’s share of total industry wells*. The 
increase in the top four producer’s share of total industry wells was likely caused by an 
increase in merger activity, i.e. the total number of industry wells has stayed relatively 
constant while the total number of wells owned and operated by the top four has 
increased. Mergers began in 1987 causing a decrease in the total number of firms in the 
industry to near 1976 levels. The decrease in the total number of firms eventually led to a 
slight reconcentration in natural gas production from 1993 to 1996 which coincided with 
the implementation of the NGWDA in 1993. Therefore, the coefficient on the NGWDA 
may not reflect the true impact of this legislation or may suggest that the impact was 
relatively minor and that the increase in merger activity was able to more than compensate 
for any increase in competition resulting from the NGWDA. In any case, four firm 
concentration has clearly fallen over time, with substantial decreases taking place after the 
implementation of the NGPA in 1987. The statistically significant negative coefficient for
* See Appendix V. The top four producer’s share of total industry wells rose from 
10.34% in 1990 to 11.49% in 1994.
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the NGPA in 1987 confirms four firm concentration in Texas natural gas production has 
fallen as a result of deregulation. In addition, the total number of wells and firms in the 
industry substantially increased fi"om 1986 to 1987 while prices dropped^. Overall, the 
results support arguments that deregulation has increased competition throughout the 
Texas natural gas production industry.
Assuming concentration and price-cost margins are related as Bain (1951, 1956), 
Shepherd (1972), and Phillips (1972) all suggest, then the statistically significant decrease 
in four firm concentration after implementation of the NGPA in 1987 has increased 
competitive pressures for Texas natural gas producers. The increase in competition 
should benefit all market participants as prices are driven toward marginal costs. 
Deregulation of natural gas markets, where appropriate, should continue. In addition, 
providing more LDC small customers, including residential, small commercial, and small 
industrial customers access to purchase their own wellhead supply should be considered. 
Allowing these customers to benefit from direct wellhead access would immediately 
distribute the benefits of increased competition to all LDC customers not just the largest 
users on the LDC system.
In addition to determining the impact of deregulation on Texas natural gas 
production the study also determines the impact of entry barriers, business cycles, and 
lagged natural gas prices during the study period. The study shows that both business 
cycles and lagged natural gas prices can have a statistically significant impact on four firm 
concentration but that entry barriers were insignificant during the study period. The
See Appendix V.
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significance of both the national industrial production index and lagged natural gas prices 
shows that Texas natural gas production industry market structure can be significantly 
influenced by changes in industry demand and supply.
Further research should be done which compares the deregulation of the natural 
gas industry to the deregulation of the electric industry. Although the electric industry is 
substantially more vertically integrated than the gas industry, i.e. more electric utilities 
directly own and operate production plants within their own jurisdictions, electricity is a 
commodity with the potential for market forces to determine price. Electricity is also a 
real time commodity, with the possibility for hourly market conditions affecting hourly 
electron prices. Although the electric industry has its own unique characteristics, utilizing 
the experience gained in deregulating the natural gas industry should be useful for 
developing policies and programs which provide the benefits of competition to electric 
customers. Federal and state regulators should be aware of the benefits o f competition to 
all consumers and providers of utility services and move expeditiously toward deregulating 
those services which can be competitive in nature.
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APPENDIX n
TIMELINE FOR NATURAL GAS 
INDUSTRY DEREGULATION
1907 - State regulation of utilities began in New York. New York’s Public Utility 
Commission became a model for others across the nation.
1938 - Natural Gas Act is enacted. Federal regulation of interstate pipelines begins.
1954 - Supreme Court rules that the Federal Power Commission has the authority to 
regulate the sale of natural gas to interstate pipelines.
1978 - Natural Gas Policy Act passed. This Act began the phase-in of complete 
deregulation of natural gas prices at the wellhead.
1989 - Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act - Deregulated all natural gas prices at the 
wellhead that had not been previously decontrolled by the NGPA.
1992 - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issues Order #636 which deregulates 
interstate transportation of natural gas; essentially providing greater access to 
wellhead supply for more buyers.
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A REGRESSION WITH A TREND VARIABLE WAS ALSO CONSIDERED
Coefficients Standard Error tStat P-value
Intercept 0.341646195 0.005121624 66.70661464 5.6285E-141
Footage -I.26577E-06 2.5705 lE-07 -4.924178576 1.74047E-06
% A IND.PROD. 0.18417257 0.147222029 1.250985133 0.212365721
NGPrice 0.019304873 0.005048782 3.823669173 0.000174415
NGPA-1V85 0.000265589 5.77199E-05 4.601334252 7.34906E-06
NGPA-7\87 0.000138958 5.46839E-05 2.54112102 0.011789618
NGWDA-5\9I 6.90848E-05 3.07384E-05 2.247508636 0.025672615
NGWDA-1\93 0.00013158 3.06777E-05 4.289101565 2.76249E-05
636-4\92 7.13064E-05 3.67975E-05 1.937807593 0.05402037
Trend -0.001625946 0.000130503 -12.45903001 6.78048E-27
ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS
Coefficients Standard Error tStat P-value
Intercept -7.31185E-05 0.000693308 -0.105463338 0.916107878
e-1 0.709212868 0.047970843 14.78424859 1.84532E-34
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MATRIX WITH NUMBER OF WELLS
Year
Ave. # Wells 
Top 4




Total #  
of Firms
1976 3264 36354 8.98% 0.58 3,984
1977 3179 27811 11.43% 0.79 3.237
1978 3111 29221 10.65% 0.91 3,389
1979 5830 45113 12.92% 1.14 4,879
1980 6181 49229 12.56% 1.61 5,195
1981 6611 53805 12.29% 2.06 5,496
1982 6996 59096 11.84% 2.47 5,871
1983 7903 63101 12.52% 2.62 6,175
1984 7981 66804 11.95% 2.66 6,347
1985 6612 58918 11.22% 2.48 5,749
1986 5939 57239 10.38% 1.94 5,397
1987 6227 66041 9.43% 1.71 5,739
1988 6470 66373 9.75% 1.68 5,469
1989 6418 66036 9.72% 1.71 5,258
1990 6640 64215 10.34% 1.70 4,982
1991 6574 63975 10.28% 1.58 4,685
1992 7099 63137 11.24% 1.73 4,397
1993 7040 63912 11.02% 2.01 4,195
1994 7445 64811 11.49% 1.82 4,064
1995 6322 64841 9.75% 1.55 3,909
1996 5460 55940 9.76% 2.1 3,667
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